| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results | |
| Myrna Wooders; Edward Cartwright | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on å so that there exists a Nash å-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent with conformity. We also introduce a new concept of conformity that allows players to conform and yet perform different actions. This is achieved by the endogenous assignment of roles to players and by allowing actions to be conditional on roles. We conclude by relating our research to some experimental literature. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/social-conformity-and-bounded-rationality-in-arbitrary-games-with-incomplete-information-some-first-results/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116948 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Myrna Wooders,Edward Cartwright. Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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