| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players | |
| Myrna Wooders; Edward Cartwright | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by issues of imitation, learning and evolution, we introduce a framework of non-co-operative games, allowing both countable sets of pure actions and player types and player types and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be used to construct a Nash å-equilibrium in pure strategies that is 'å-equivalent'. Our framework introduces and exploits a distinction between crowding attributes of players (their external effects on others) and their taste attributes (their payoff functions and any other attributes that are not directly relevant to other players). The set of crowding attributes is assumed to be compact; this is not required, however, for taste attributes. We stress that for studying issues such as conformity, the case of a finite set of types and actions, while illuminating, cannot yield completely satisfactory results. Our main theorems are based on a new mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem but applicable to a countable (not necessarily finite dimensional) strategy space. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-equilibrium-in-pure-strategies-in-games-with-many-players/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116951 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Myrna Wooders,Edward Cartwright. On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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