| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players | |
| Myrna Wooders; Edward Cartwright | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large å must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/conformity-and-bounded-rationality-in-games-with-many-players/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116952 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Myrna Wooders,Edward Cartwright. Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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