| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions | |
| Sander Onderstal; Florian Englmaier; Pablo Guillen; Loreto Llorente | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is slightly less efficient but yields far more revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction. |
| 特色分类 | C9,D44 |
| 关键词 | Chopstick auction,Exposure problem,Laboratory experiment,Second-price |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-chopstick-auction-a-study-of-the-exposure-problem-in-multi-unit-auctions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116962 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sander Onderstal,Florian Englmaier,Pablo Guillen,et al. The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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