| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values |
| Ohad Kadan
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| 发表日期 | 2004
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2004
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We prove the existence of an increasing equilibrium, and study the comparative statics of correlation in the k-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence in valuations between buyers and sellers. In the case k Î{0 ,1} there exists a unique equilibrium in non-dominated strategies. Using this equilibrium we show that correlation has a dual effect on strategic bidding. It might impose bidders to become more or less aggressive depending on their private valuation, and on the level of correlation. In the case k Î (0 ,1), we prove the existence of a family of strictly increasing equilibria, and demonstrate them using examples. Moreover, we show that equilibria in the case of independent private values are pointwise limits of equilibria with strictly affiliated private values. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D44
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| 关键词 | Double auctions,Affiliation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/equilibrium-in-the-two-player-k-double-auction-with-affiliated-private-values/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116964
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ohad Kadan. Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values. 2004.
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文件名：
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NDL2004-012.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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