| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers | |
| Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious; Aner Sela | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D72,D82 |
| 关键词 | Private-value auctions,Risk aversion,Perturbation analysis |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/all-pay-auctions-with-weakly-risk-averse-buyers/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116966 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gadi Fibich,Arieh Gavious,Aner Sela. All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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