G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions:An Experimental Examination
Orly Sade; Charles Schnitzlein; Jaime F. Zender
发表日期2004
出处Economy and Society
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations
特色分类C90,D44
关键词Divisible good,Auctions,Experimental economics
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/competition-and-cooperation-in-divisible-good-auctions-an-experimental-examination/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116967
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Orly Sade,Charles Schnitzlein,Jaime F. Zender. Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions:An Experimental Examination. 2004.
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