| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions:An Experimental Examination | |
| Orly Sade; Charles Schnitzlein; Jaime F. Zender | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations |
| 特色分类 | C90,D44 |
| 关键词 | Divisible good,Auctions,Experimental economics |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/competition-and-cooperation-in-divisible-good-auctions-an-experimental-examination/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116967 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Orly Sade,Charles Schnitzlein,Jaime F. Zender. Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions:An Experimental Examination. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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