| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems | |
| Michael Finus | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models. |
| 特色分类 | C7,H41,Q2 |
| 关键词 | International pollution,International environmental agreements,Treaty design,Coalition theory |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/international-cooperation-to-resolve-international-pollution-problems/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116993 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus. International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-041.pdf（1123KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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