G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
Marco Marini; Sergio Currarini
发表日期2004
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions. We illustrate the role of synergies in a Cournot oligopoly example with cost reducing R&D.
特色分类C7
关键词Coalition formation,Synergies,Strong Nash equilibrium
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-formation-in-games-without-synergies/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116995
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marco Marini,Sergio Currarini. Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies. 2004.
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