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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies | |
Marco Marini; Sergio Currarini | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions. We illustrate the role of synergies in a Cournot oligopoly example with cost reducing R&D. |
特色分类 | C7 |
关键词 | Coalition formation,Synergies,Strong Nash equilibrium |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-formation-in-games-without-synergies/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116995 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Marini,Sergio Currarini. Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies. 2004. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-043.pdf(519KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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