全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
	Marco Marini; Sergio Currarini
发表日期	2004
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions. We illustrate the role of synergies in a Cournot oligopoly example with cost reducing R&D.
特色分类	C7
关键词	Coalition formation,Synergies,Strong Nash equilibrium
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-formation-in-games-without-synergies/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116995
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Marini,Sergio Currarini. Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies. 2004.