| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability | |
| Marc Escrihuela-Villar | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. |
| 特色分类 | L11,L13,L41,D43 |
| 关键词 | Collusion,Partial cartels,Trigger strategies,Optimal punishment |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cartel-sustainability-and-cartel-stability/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116996 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Escrihuela-Villar. Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-044.pdf（549KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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