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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability | |
Marc Escrihuela-Villar | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. |
特色分类 | L11,L13,L41,D43 |
关键词 | Collusion,Partial cartels,Trigger strategies,Optimal punishment |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cartel-sustainability-and-cartel-stability/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116996 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Escrihuela-Villar. Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability. 2004. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-044.pdf(549KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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