G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
Marc Escrihuela-Villar
发表日期2004
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.
特色分类L11,L13,L41,D43
关键词Collusion,Partial cartels,Trigger strategies,Optimal punishment
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cartel-sustainability-and-cartel-stability/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116996
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marc Escrihuela-Villar. Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability. 2004.
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