| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games | |
| Dinko Dimitrov; Peter Borm; Ruud Hendrickx; Shao Chin Sung | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature |
| 特色分类 | C71,A14,D20 |
| 关键词 | Additive separability,Coalition formation,Core stability,Hedonic games,NP-completeness,Priority |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/simple-priorities-and-core-stability-in-hedonic-games/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117003 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dinko Dimitrov,Peter Borm,Ruud Hendrickx,et al. Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-051.pdf（469KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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