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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach | |
Anastasios Xepapadeas; Costadina Passa | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The joint evolution of participating and complying firms in a public VA, along with the evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replicator dynamics modeling participation and compliance are combined with pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow selection dynamics are used to capture the fact that decisions to participate in and further comply with the public VA evolve in different time scales. Evolutionary stable (ES) equilibria depend on the structure of the legislation and auditing probability. Partial participation and partial compliance can be ES equilibria, with possible multiplicities, in addition to the monomorphic equilibria of full (non) compliance. Convergence to these equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and compliance can be attained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance fine. |
特色分类 | Q2,L5 |
关键词 | Voluntary agreements,Participation,Compliance,Evolutionary stability,Replicator dynamics |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/participation-in-and-compliance-with-public-voluntary-environmental-programs-an-evolutionary-approach/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117018 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anastasios Xepapadeas,Costadina Passa. Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-067.pdf(608KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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