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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options | |
Francis Bloch; Armando Gomes | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when players become perfectly patient. If outside options are not pure, all Markov perfect equilibria may be inefficient. The distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. |
特色分类 | C71,C72,C78,D62 |
关键词 | Outside options,Externalities,Coalitional bargaining |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contracting-with-externalities-and-outside-options/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117029 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francis Bloch,Armando Gomes. Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options. 2004. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-078.pdf(868KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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