G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
Francis Bloch; Armando Gomes
发表日期2004
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when players become perfectly patient. If outside options are not pure, all Markov perfect equilibria may be inefficient. The distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications.
特色分类C71,C72,C78,D62
关键词Outside options,Externalities,Coalitional bargaining
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contracting-with-externalities-and-outside-options/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117029
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Francis Bloch,Armando Gomes. Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options. 2004.
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