全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
	Francis Bloch; Armando Gomes
发表日期	2004
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when players become perfectly patient. If outside options are not pure, all Markov perfect equilibria may be inefficient. The distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications.
特色分类	C71,C72,C78,D62
关键词	Outside options,Externalities,Coalitional bargaining
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contracting-with-externalities-and-outside-options/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117029
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Francis Bloch,Armando Gomes. Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options. 2004.