| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation | |
| Rod Garratt; Cheng Zhong Qin; James E. Parco; Amnon Rapoport | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium are also tested. |
| 特色分类 | C72,C78,D72 |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation,Potential maximization,Nash equilibrium refinements, |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/potential-maximization-and-coalition-government-formation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rod Garratt,Cheng Zhong Qin,James E. Parco,et al. Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-082.pdf（398KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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