| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players | |
| Edward Cartwright | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under which play evolves to an imitation equilibrium; convergence is conditional on the network of social interaction. We then illustrate, through example, how imitation and innovation can complement each other; in particular, we demonstrate how imitation can .help. a population to learn to play a Nash equilibrium where more rational methods do not. This leads to our main result in which we provide a general class of large game for which the imitation with innovation dynamic almost surely converges to an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium. |
| 特色分类 | C70,C72,C73 |
| 关键词 | Imitation,Best replay,Convergence,Nash equilibrium |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/learning-to-play-approximate-nash-equilibria-in-games-with-many-players/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117036 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward Cartwright. Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-085.pdf（502KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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