| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Climate Agreements and Technology Policy |
| Michael Hoel; Rolf Golombek
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| 发表日期 | 2004
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2004
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax. Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum. |
| 特色分类 | O30,H23,Q20,Q28,Q48
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| 关键词 | Climate policy,International environmental agreements,R&D Policy,Technology spillovers
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/climate-agreements-and-technology-policy/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117041
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Michael Hoel,Rolf Golombek. Climate Agreements and Technology Policy. 2004.
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文件名：
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NDL2004-090.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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