| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction | |
| Sergei Izmalkov | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions all the bidders compete simultaneously in the open ascending price format. The most distinctive feature of the mechanism is that winners are determined first, and then additional auxillary auctions are conducted to determine prices. The total number of auctions depends only on the number of goods to be allocated and not on the number of bidders. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D44 |
| 关键词 | Multiple units,Interdependent values,Sequential auctions,Ascending price auction |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/multi-unit-open-ascending-price-efficient-auction/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117042 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sergei Izmalkov. Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-091.pdf（500KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Sergei Izmalkov]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Sergei Izmalkov]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Sergei Izmalkov]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
