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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation | |
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Mandar P Oak | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining. |
特色分类 | C72,D72,H19 |
关键词 | Proportional representation,Party formation,Coalitions |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/party-formation-and-coalitional-bargaining-in-a-model-of-proportional-representation/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117049 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay,Mandar P Oak. Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-098.pdf(512KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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