| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase. The government internalizes that restructuring increases the sales price not only from the increase in the acquirer’s profit, but also from a reduced profit for the non-acquirer, whose profits decrease due to its rival’s restructuring. We also identify situations where a slow sale can significantly reduce the sales price because of strategic investment and product market effects. |
| 特色分类 | D44,L1,L33,L4,P31 |
| 关键词 | Privatization,Asset ownership,Restructuring |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/privatization-and-restructuring-in-concentrated-markets/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117058 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck. Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-107.pdf（890KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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