| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement Under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited |
| Paul Mensink
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| 发表日期 | 2004
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2004
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to join a coalition whose members mutually truthfully exchange information as well as commit themselves with respect to their abatement decisions. As a result, the differential tax triggers instantly - i.e. no abatement adaptation is needed - efficient abatement levels without the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. Consequently, this paper shows that differential taxation results in lower social costs than traditional non-linear taxation which triggers efficient emissions only after a period of non-efficient abatement. |
| 特色分类 | C71,D62,D82,Q20
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| 关键词 | Externalities,Pollution taxes,Coalition formation,Non-linear taxation,Asymmetric information,Co-operative game theory
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/instant-efficient-pollution-abatement-under-non-linear-taxation-and-asymmetric-information-the-differential-tax-revisited/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117075
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Paul Mensink. Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement Under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited. 2004.
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