| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game | |
| Christophe Deissenberg; Herbert Dawid; Pavel Ševcik | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a cost. The proportion of Believers and Non- Believers changes over time depending on the relative profits of both groups. We show that the Regulator can use misleading tax announcements to steer the economy to an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the solutions usually suggested in the literature. Depending upon the initial proportion of Believers, the Regulator may prefer a fast or a low speed of reaction of the firms to differences in Believers/Non-Believers profits. |
| 特色分类 | H23,H3,Q5,C69,C79,D62 |
| 关键词 | Environmental policy,Emissions taxes,Time inconsistency,Heterogeneous agents,Bounded rationality,Learning,Multiple equilibria,Stackelberg games |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cheap-talk-gullibility-and-welfare-in-an-environmental-taxation-game/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117088 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christophe Deissenberg,Herbert Dawid,Pavel Ševcik. Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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