| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics | |
| Roberto Burguet | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities acquired. For asymmetric sellers, the optimal distortions are familiar. The problem is similar to the third degree discriminating monopsonist problem, just as in the unit (flat) demand case (Bulow-Roberts, 1989), and when the number of sellers (and the demand) grows their outcomes approach at the speed of the law of large numbers. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D42 |
| 关键词 | Auctions,Monopsony |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/optimal-procurement-auction-for-a-buyer-with-downward-sloping-demand-more-simple-economics/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117095 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roberto Burguet. Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics. 2004. |
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