| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| How to Win Twice at an Auction. On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets | |
| Victor Ginsburgh; Patrick Legros; Nicolas Sahuguet | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by the organizer of an auction. Commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers and the economic problem that results looks similar to the question of tax incidence in consumer economics. We argue, however, that auction markets deserve a separate treatment. Indeed we show that an increase in commissions makes sellers worse off, but some (or all) buyers may gain. The results are therefore strikingly different from the standard result that all consumers lose after a tax or a commission increase. We apply our results to comment on the class action against Christie's and Sotheby's and argue that the method used to distribute compensations was misguided. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D80 |
| 关键词 | Auction,Intermediation,Commissions,Welfare |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/how-to-win-twice-at-an-auction-on-the-incidence-of-commissions-in-auction-markets/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117097 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Victor Ginsburgh,Patrick Legros,Nicolas Sahuguet. How to Win Twice at an Auction. On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-146.pdf（1089KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
