| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions | |
| Claudio Mezzetti; Aleksandar Pekeè; Ilia Tsetlin | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces first-round revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k1 + k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify two informational effects: a positive effect on second-round price and an ambiguous effect on first-round price. The expected first-round price can be greater or smaller than with no bid announcement, and greater or smaller than the expected price in a single-round uniform auction. As a result, total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement can be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D42 |
| 关键词 | Multi-unit auctions,Sequential auctions,Uniform-price auction,Affiliated values,Information revelation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/sequential-vs-single-round-uniform-price-auctions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117098 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudio Mezzetti,Aleksandar Pekeè,Ilia Tsetlin. Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-147.pdf（917KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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