全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions
	John Asker; Estelle Cantillon
发表日期	2004
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional bids submitted by each supplier to a single dimension, the score, which is used for deciding on the allocation and the resulting contractual obligation. We exploit this idea and obtain two kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in standard single object IPV auctions. Second, we prove a new expected utility equivalence theorem for quasi-linear scoring auctions.
特色分类	H57,D44
关键词	Auctions,Procurement
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/equilibrium-in-scoring-auctions/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117099
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	John Asker,Estelle Cantillon. Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions. 2004.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
NDL2004-148.pdf（368KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览