| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions | |
| Philip A. Haile; Han Hong; Matthew Shum | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner’s curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder’s conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ("scaled") sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For "lumpsum" sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis. |
| 特色分类 | C14,D44 |
| 关键词 | First-price auctions,Common values,Private values,Nonparametric testing,Winner’s curse,Stochastic dominance,Endogenous participation,Timber auctions |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/nonparametric-tests-for-common-values-in-first-price-sealed-bid-auctions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117100 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philip A. Haile,Han Hong,Matthew Shum. Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-149.pdf（1923KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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