| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly | |
| Alejandro M. Manelli; Daniel R. Vincent | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the feasible set. With N = 1, the extreme points are easily described providing simple proofs of well-known results. The revenue-maximizing mechanism assigns the object with probability one or zero depending on the buyer's report. With N > 1, extreme points often involve randomization in the assignment of goods. Virtually any extreme point of the feasible set maximizes revenue for a well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. |
| 特色分类 | D44 |
| 关键词 | Extreme point,Exposed point,Faces,Non-linear pricing,Monopoly pricing,Multidimensional,Screening,Incentive compatibility,Adverse selection,Mechanism design |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/multidimensional-mechanism-design-revenue-maximization-and-the-multiple-good-monopoly/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117104 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alejandro M. Manelli,Daniel R. Vincent. Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2004-153.pdf（836KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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