全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
	Johan Eyckmans; Michael Finus
发表日期	2004
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are "almost ideal" in that they stabilize these coalitions which generate the highest global welfare among the set of "potentially stable coalitions". Our sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding.
特色分类	C70,C71
关键词	Coalition games,Partition function,Externalities,Sharing schemes
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/an-almost-ideal-sharing-scheme-for-coalition-games-with-externalities/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117106
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Johan Eyckmans,Michael Finus. An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities. 2004.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
NDL2004-155.pdf（328KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览