G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
Johan Eyckmans; Michael Finus
发表日期2004
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are "almost ideal" in that they stabilize these coalitions which generate the highest global welfare among the set of "potentially stable coalitions". Our sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding.
特色分类C70,C71
关键词Coalition games,Partition function,Externalities,Sharing schemes
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/an-almost-ideal-sharing-scheme-for-coalition-games-with-externalities/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117106
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Johan Eyckmans,Michael Finus. An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities. 2004.
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