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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities | |
Johan Eyckmans; Michael Finus | |
发表日期 | 2004 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are "almost ideal" in that they stabilize these coalitions which generate the highest global welfare among the set of "potentially stable coalitions". Our sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding. |
特色分类 | C70,C71 |
关键词 | Coalition games,Partition function,Externalities,Sharing schemes |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/an-almost-ideal-sharing-scheme-for-coalition-games-with-externalities/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117106 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Eyckmans,Michael Finus. An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities. 2004. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2004-155.pdf(328KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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