| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Platform Competition with Endogenous Multihoming |
| Roberto Roson
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| 发表日期 | 2005
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2005
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | A model of two-sided market (for credit cards) is introduced and discussed. In this model, agents can join none, one, or more than one platform (multihoming), depending on access prices and the choices made by agents on the opposite market side. Although emerging multihoming patterns are, clearly, one aspect of equilibrium in a two-sided market, this issue has not yet been thoroughly addressed in the literature. This paper provides a general theoretical framework, in which homing partitions are conceived as one aspect of market equilibrium, rather than being set ex-ante, through ad-hoc assumptions. The emergence of a specific equilibrium partition is a consequence of: (1) the structure of costs and benefits, (2) the degree and type of heterogeneity among agents, (3) the intensity of platform competition. |
| 特色分类 | D85,L10,L15,L89
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| 关键词 | Two-sided markets,Network externalities,Standards,Platforms,
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/platform-competition-with-endogenous-multihoming/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117133
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Roberto Roson. Platform Competition with Endogenous Multihoming. 2005.
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文件名：
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NDL2005-020.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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