| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria | |
| Michael Finus; Pierre van Mouche; Bianca Rundshagen | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game. |
| 特色分类 | C71 |
| 关键词 | existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium,game in strategic form |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/uniqueness-of-coalitional-equilibria/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117136 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Pierre van Mouche,Bianca Rundshagen. Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-023.pdf（265KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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