| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility | |
| Michele Moretto; Chiara D. Alpaos; Cesare Dosi | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces the issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is whether or not the concessionare should be allowed to set the timing of new investments. In this paper we investigate the impact of concession length and investment timing flexibility on the "concession value". It is generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they enable a concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option theory suggests that investment flexibility has an intrinsic value, as it allows concessionaires to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one may argue that long- term contracts, which allow for investment timing flexibility, should always result in higher concession values. Our result suggests that this is not always the case. Firstly, investment flexibility does not always increase the concession value. Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value. |
| 特色分类 | D81,G31,L95 |
| 关键词 | Concession contracts,Real option theory,Investment timing flexibility,Water utilities |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/concession-length-and-investment-timing-flexibility/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117145 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Moretto,Chiara D. Alpaos,Cesare Dosi. Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-032.pdf（491KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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