| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation | |
| Antoni Calvó-Armengol; Rahmi Ilkiliç | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, while pairwise-Nash networks are robust to one-link creation but multi-link severance. Under these conditions, proper equilibria in pure strategies are fully characterized by one-link deviation checks. |
| 特色分类 | C62,C72,D85,L14 |
| 关键词 | Network formation,Pairwise-stability,Proper equilibrium |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/pairwise-stability-and-nash-equilibria-in-network-formation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117147 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antoni Calvó-Armengol,Rahmi Ilkiliç. Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-034.pdf（990KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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