G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the Resilience of Referral Hiring
Alessandra Casella; Nobuyuki Hanaki
发表日期2005
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要Economists and sociologists disagree over markets' potential to assume functions typically performed by networks of personal connections, first among them the transmission of information. This paper begins from a model of labor markets where social ties are stronger between similar individuals and firms employing productive workers prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the anonymous market (Montgomery (1991). However, we allow workers in the market to engage in a costly action that can signal their high productivity, and ask whether the possibility of signaling reduces the reliance on the network. We find that the network is remarkably resilient. To be effective signaling must fulfill two contradictory requirements: unless the signal is extremely precise, it must be expensive or it is not informative; but it must be cheap, or the network can undercut it.
特色分类A14,J31,J41,D83
关键词Networks,Signaling,Referral hiring,Referral premium
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/information-channels-in-labor-markets-on-the-resilience-of-referral-hiring/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117150
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandra Casella,Nobuyuki Hanaki. Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the Resilience of Referral Hiring. 2005.
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NDL2005-037.pdf(560KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
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