| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the Resilience of Referral Hiring | |
| Alessandra Casella; Nobuyuki Hanaki | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists and sociologists disagree over markets' potential to assume functions typically performed by networks of personal connections, first among them the transmission of information. This paper begins from a model of labor markets where social ties are stronger between similar individuals and firms employing productive workers prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the anonymous market (Montgomery (1991). However, we allow workers in the market to engage in a costly action that can signal their high productivity, and ask whether the possibility of signaling reduces the reliance on the network. We find that the network is remarkably resilient. To be effective signaling must fulfill two contradictory requirements: unless the signal is extremely precise, it must be expensive or it is not informative; but it must be cheap, or the network can undercut it. |
| 特色分类 | A14,J31,J41,D83 |
| 关键词 | Networks,Signaling,Referral hiring,Referral premium |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/information-channels-in-labor-markets-on-the-resilience-of-referral-hiring/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117150 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Nobuyuki Hanaki. Information Channels in Labor Markets. On the Resilience of Referral Hiring. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-037.pdf（560KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
