| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games | |
| Matthew O. Jackson; Alison Watts | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. |
| 特色分类 | A14,C71,C72,C78,J41 |
| 关键词 | Social games,Matching,Games,Repeated games,Renegotiation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/social-games-matching-and-the-play-of-finitely-repeated-games/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117151 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew O. Jackson,Alison Watts. Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-038.pdf（284KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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