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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements | |
Aart de Zeeuw | |
发表日期 | 2005 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained. |
特色分类 | Q2,C70,F42 |
关键词 | IEA’s,Coalitional stability,Dynamics |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/dynamic-effects-on-the-stability-of-international-environmental-agreements/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117154 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aart de Zeeuw. Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. 2005. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2005-041.pdf(273KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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