G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
Aart de Zeeuw
发表日期2005
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.
特色分类Q2,C70,F42
关键词IEA’s,Coalitional stability,Dynamics
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/dynamic-effects-on-the-stability-of-international-environmental-agreements/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117154
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aart de Zeeuw. Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. 2005.
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