| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation | |
| Michael Finus; Bianca Rundshagen | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D70,H41,Q50 |
| 关键词 | International environmental agreements,Timing of participation decision, |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/participation-in-international-environmental-agreements-the-role-of-timing-and-regulation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117158 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Bianca Rundshagen. Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-045.pdf（436KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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