| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms | |
| Vincent Vannetelbosch; Ana Mauleon; José Sempere-Monerris | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the spillovers. |
| 特色分类 | C70,L13,L20,J50,J52 |
| 关键词 | Networks,R&D collaboration,Oligopoly,Unions |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/r-amp-d-networks-among-unionized-firms/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117162 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincent Vannetelbosch,Ana Mauleon,José Sempere-Monerris. R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-049.pdf（2005KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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