| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule | |
| Hans-Peter Weikard | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players. This assumption is very restrictive in many economic environments. This paper analyses stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called "optimal sharing" which stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called "non-essentiality" and determine the set of stable cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse cartel stability under optimal sharing in simple public goods game with heterogeneous players. My results show - in contrast to earlier findings for identical players - that large coalitions may well be stable. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D72,H41 |
| 关键词 | Cartel stability,Coalition formation games with spillovers,Partition function |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cartel-stability-under-an-optimal-sharing-rule/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117189 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans-Peter Weikard. Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-077.pdf（463KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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