| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game | |
| Joëlle Noailly; Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh; Cees A Withagen | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996). |
| 特色分类 | C72,Q2 |
| 关键词 | Common property,Cooperation,Evolutionary game theory,Global interactions,Local interactions,Social norms |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/local-and-global-interactions-in-an-evolutionary-resource-game/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117190 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joëlle Noailly,Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh,Cees A Withagen. Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-078.pdf（604KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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