G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game
Joëlle Noailly; Cees A. Withagen; Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh
发表日期2005
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.
特色分类C72,Q2
关键词Common property,Evolutionary game theory,Local interactions game,Self-organization,Cooperation
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/spatial-evolution-of-social-norms-in-a-common-pool-resource-game/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117191
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Joëlle Noailly,Cees A. Withagen,Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh. Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game. 2005.
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