| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game | |
| Joëlle Noailly; Cees A. Withagen; Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. |
| 特色分类 | C72,Q2 |
| 关键词 | Common property,Evolutionary game theory,Local interactions game,Self-organization,Cooperation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/spatial-evolution-of-social-norms-in-a-common-pool-resource-game/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117191 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joëlle Noailly,Cees A. Withagen,Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh. Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-079.pdf（611KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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