| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Abuse of competitive fringe |
| Carlo Capuano
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| 发表日期 | 2005
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2005
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We deny that. In fact, if it is true that in single dominance cases the presence of a competitive fringe significantly reduces the price increasing profitability and the leader market power, when we consider collective dominance cases the deviation profitability and the punishment mechanism become crucial. In this paper after introducing a minimal structural and strategical framework needed for describing this kind of competition, we prove that not only the presence of a competitive fringe is a collusive plus factor, but also that there exists a critical dimension of the fringe such that collusion is a Nash equilibrium of the static game. |
| 特色分类 | D43,L1,L13
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| 关键词 | Collusion,Oligopoly,Competitive fringe,Bertrand,Nash
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/abuse-of-competitive-fringe/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117203
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Carlo Capuano. Abuse of competitive fringe. 2005.
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文件名：
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NDL2005-091.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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