全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage
	Pascal Gautier; Raphaël Soubeyran
发表日期	2005
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur. .
特色分类	D72,H41,C72
关键词	Cycles,Alternation,Public goods,Advantage,Opposition
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/political-cycles-the-opposition-advantage/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117241
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Pascal Gautier,Raphaël Soubeyran. Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage. 2005.