| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games | |
| Giovanni Di Bartolomeo; Nicola Acocella | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence. |
| 特色分类 | C72,E52,E61 |
| 关键词 | Policy games,policy ineffectiveness,static controllability,Nash equilibrium existence |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tinbergen-and-theil-meet-nash-controllability-in-policy-games/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117244 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Di Bartolomeo,Nicola Acocella. Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-132.pdf（223KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
