| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence |
| Giuseppe Di Vita
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| 发表日期 | 2006
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In this article we apply and extend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier in their seminal paper (2000), to examine how the economy represented in their theoretical framework responds to an exogenous change in the agent's incentive. In particular, we focus on the consequences of a famous sentence of the Italian Supreme Court in plenary session, no. 500 of 1999, in which a revolutionary interpretation of civil liability rules is introduced, allowing private agents of our economy to appear before the court to demand reimbursement for the damages suffered as a consequence of illicit behavior of the public administration. This is one of the few cases in which the judex substantially makes law in a system of civil law, and the modification in incentive whether or not to be corrupted comes from an authority that is not part of the game (the jurisdictional power). Basing our affirmations on the model, we can say that corruption may have declined in Italy since the year 2000, as a result of a change in the incentives for both private agents and bureaucrats. |
| 特色分类 | K13;D23;H41
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| 关键词 | Bureaucrats,Government failure,Incentives,Market failure,Public goods
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/corruption-exogenous-changes-in-incentives-and-deterrence/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117280
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giuseppe Di Vita. Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence. 2006.
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文件名：
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NDL2006-016.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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