| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems |
| Somdeb Lahiri
|
| 发表日期 | 2006
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989), as well as a weaker version of it, may be empty for contract choice problems, thereby implying that the weakening we suggest is in some ways “tight”. |
| 特色分类 | C78,D71
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| 关键词 | Weak bargaining set,Contract choice,NTU game,Matching
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-weak-bargaining-set-for-contract-choice-problems/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117283
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Somdeb Lahiri. A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems. 2006.
|
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