| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core | |
| Dinko Dimitrov; Claus Jochen Haake | |
| 发表日期 | 2006 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty. |
| 特色分类 | D72,C71 |
| 关键词 | Coalition Formation,Paradox of Smaller Coalitions,Semistrict Core,Simple Games,Winning Coalitions |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-formation-in-simple-games-the-semistrict-core/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117335 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dinko Dimitrov,Claus Jochen Haake. Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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