| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation |
| Nicolas Querou; Sylvain Beal
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| 发表日期 | 2006
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and the Repeated Nash Equilibrium (RNE), in which different networks may form. We state a sufficient condition under which a given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form totally different networks at each period, or the networks within a given RNE may exhibit a total order relationship. Finally we investigate the question of efficiency for both Bentham and Pareto criteria. |
| 特色分类 | C72
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| 关键词 | Repeated Network Formation Game,Two-sided Link Formation Costs,Bounded Rationality,Automata
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bounded-rationality-and-repeated-network-formation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117337
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Nicolas Querou,Sylvain Beal. Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation. 2006.
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