| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Bilateral Commitment | |
| Guillaume Haeringer; Sophie Bade; Ludovic Renou | |
| 发表日期 | 2006 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of implementable profiles and provide a simple method to find them. Profiles implementable by bilateral commitments are shown to be generically inefficient. Surprisingly, allowing for gradualism (i.e., step by step commitment) does not change the set of implementable profiles. |
| 特色分类 | C70,C72,H87 |
| 关键词 | Commitment,Self-enforcing,Treaties,Inefficiency,Agreements,Pareto-improvement |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bilateral-commitment/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117338 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume Haeringer,Sophie Bade,Ludovic Renou. Bilateral Commitment. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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