| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy | |
| Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Mandar P Oak | |
| 发表日期 | 2006 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D72,H19 |
| 关键词 | Coalitions,Ideology,Rents |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-governments-in-a-model-of-parliamentary-democracy/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117346 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay,Mandar P Oak. Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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