| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An Application of Fund |
| Richard S.J. Tol
|
| 发表日期 | 2006
|
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | I compare and contrast five climate scenarios: (1) no climate policy; (2) non-cooperative cost-benefit analysis (NC CBA); (3) NC CBA with international permit trade; (4) NC CBA with joint and several liability for climate change damages; and (5) NC CBA with liability proportional to a country's share in cumulative emissions. As estimates of the marginal damage costs are low, standard NC CBA implies only limited emission abatement. With international permit trade, emission abatement is even less, as the carbon tax is reduced in countries with fast-growing emissions, and because a permit market ignores the positive, dynamic externalities of abatement. Proportional liability shifts abatement effort towards the richer countries, but away from the fast-growing economies; again, long-term, global emission abatement is reduced. Joint and several liability would lead to more stringent climate policy. These findings are qualitatively robust to the size and accounting of climate change impacts, to the definition of liability, and to the baseline scenario. |
| 特色分类 | Q540
|
| 关键词 | Climate Change,Cost-benefit Analysis,Liability,Permit Trade
|
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-polluter-pays-principle-and-cost-benefit-analysis-of-climate-change-an-application-of-fund/
|
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117351
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Richard S.J. Tol. The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An Application of Fund. 2006.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
